Solitary Indignation

T he man who knows technique must see far and see clear. If he cannot see clear, he cannot light up what is hidden. The man who can wield the law must be hard and straight. If he is not straight, he cannot bend the crooked back into line. The man of wisdom-and-technique must have far sight and clear discernment; without clear discernment he cannot illuminate what is private/hidden. The man able-in-law must be strong-resolute and stiff-straight; without stiff-straightness he cannot rectify the crooked/treacherous.

A minister who follows orders, handles his office by the book — no one calls him a man of weight. The man of weight is the one who acts on his own with no order given, who bends the law to line his own pocket, drains the state to fatten his house, and has the strength to seize hold of his ruler. That is what a man of weight is. Put the men of technique and law to work, and the heavy ministers fall outside the measuring line. So the man of law-and-technique and the man who blocks the path are enemies who cannot both survive. A minister who follows commands and attends to business, who handles his office according to law — this is not called a 'man of weight.' The man of weight is one who, with no command, acts on his own authority, shaves the law to benefit his private interest, wastes the state to convenience his household, and whose strength can take hold of his ruler — this is what is called a man of weight. When men of wisdom-technique and ability-in-law are employed, the noble heavy ministers must fall outside the marking-cord. Thus the man of wisdom-and-law and the man-who-controls-the-road are enemies who cannot both be preserved.

Once the man who blocks the path has the levers, everyone inside and out works for him. Other states get nothing done unless they go through him — so foreign powers plead his case. The hundred offices advance nothing unless they go through him — so the officials are his tools. The palace attendants cannot reach the ruler unless they go through him — so the ruler's own people cover for him. The scholars get a thin stipend and slight courtesy unless they go through him — so the scholars talk him up. These four supports are how the corrupt minister dresses himself. When the man-who-blocks-the-road monopolizes the levers of affairs, then outside and inside become his instruments. Thus the feudal lords, unless they rely on him, get no response to their affairs — so enemy states plead for him. The hundred offices, unless they rely on him, see no advancement — so the assembled ministers are his tools. The court attendants (langzhong), unless they rely on him, cannot get near the ruler — so those at the ruler's side conceal for him. The scholars, unless they rely on him, get thin stipend and lowly courtesy — so the scholars speak for him. These four aids are how the depraved minister adorns himself.

“A lone voice against a whole country: by the count, he does not win.”

The man of weight will not serve his ruler loyally by advancing the man he hates, and the ruler cannot see past those four supports to read his own minister clearly. So the ruler grows blinder and the great minister grows heavier. The man who blocks the path is, with his ruler, rarely anything but trusted and loved — and on top of that, an old familiar. He echoes the ruler's likes and dislikes, which is exactly how he climbed. His rank is high, his faction is large, and the whole country pleads his case. The man of weight cannot be loyal to his ruler and advance his own enemy; the ruler cannot get past the four aids to illuminate and examine his ministers. So the ruler is increasingly veiled and the great minister increasingly heavy. In general the man-who-blocks-the-road, toward his ruler, is rarely not trusted-and-loved, and moreover is an old familiar. As for matching the ruler's heart in its likes and dislikes — that is precisely how he advanced himself. His office and rank are noble and weighty, his clique and faction are also numerous, and one whole country pleads for him.

Now the man of law and technique who wants the ruler's ear has no bond of trust or love, no warmth of old acquaintance. On top of that, he means to use the language of law and technique to correct the ruler's own crooked, biased heart — so he stands opposed to the ruler from the start. He is low in station, friendless, alone, and singular. Now the man of law-and-technique who wishes to seek out the ruler has no intimacy of trust-and-love, no moisture of old familiarity. He is moreover going to use the words of law-and-technique to rectify the ruler's biased and depraved heart — this is to stand opposed to the ruler. His position is low and base; without a faction, he is alone and singular.

Now do the count. Set the distant outsider against the close and beloved — by the odds he does not win. Set the new arrival against the old familiar — he does not win. Set the man who crosses the ruler's will against the man who shares his tastes — he does not win. Set the light and lowly against the heavy and noble — he does not win. Set one mouth against a whole country — he does not win. The man of law and technique holds five losing positions, and even over years he gets no audience. The man who blocks the path rides five winning advantages, and morning and night he alone has the ruler's ear. By what road, then, does the man of law and technique advance, and at what hour does the ruler ever wake? Now: to fight the close-beloved-trusted with the distant-estranged — by the count, no victory. To fight the old-familiar with the new traveler — by the count, no victory. To fight the sharer-of-tastes with one who opposes the ruler's intent — by the count, no victory. To fight the noble-and-weighty with the light-and-base — by the count, no victory. To fight one whole country with a single mouth — by the count, no victory. The man of law-and-technique grips the position of five non-victories, and over the span of years still cannot get an audience; the man-who-blocks-the-road, mounting the resource of five victories, morning and evening alone persuades before [the ruler]. So by what road does the man of law-and-technique get to advance, and at what time does the ruler get to awaken?

So with a resource that must lose and a position where the two cannot both survive, how is the man of law and technique not in danger? Where they can frame him with some crime, they kill him by the public law. Where they cannot pin a crime on him, they finish him with a private blade. So the man who makes law and technique clear and goes against the ruler — if he is not cut down by the executioner's law, he dies by the assassin's knife. So, with a resource that must not win and a position where the two cannot both survive, how can the man of law-and-technique not be in danger? Those whom they can defame with a crime or fault, they execute by the public law; those who cannot be covered with a crime or fault, they bring to an end with a private sword. Thus the one who makes law-and-technique clear yet goes against the ruler, if not slain in the officials' execution, must die by the private sword.

Cliques band together to veil the ruler; men twist their words to serve private ends — and these are sure to be trusted by the men of weight. The ones who can be credited with some achievement, real or borrowed, get ennobled with office and rank. The ones who cannot be dressed in a fine name get weighted with foreign backing. So those who veil the ruler and run to the private gates, if not made conspicuous in office and rank, are sure to be made heavy by foreign power. Cliques and factions join in a ring to veil the ruler; those who bend their words to convenience private interest are sure to be trusted by the men of weight. So those to whom an achievement can be lent or credited, they make noble with office and rank; those who cannot be lent a fine name, they make heavy with outside power. Thus those who veil the ruler and hasten to the private gates, if not made conspicuous in office and rank, are sure to be made weighty by outside power.

Today the ruler hands down punishments without cross-checking the evidence, and grants rank and stipend without waiting to see the work done. So how can the man of law and technique brave death to advance his case, and why would the corrupt minister ever ride his profits out the door and step aside? So the ruler sinks lower and the private gates climb higher. Now the ruler, without combining the cross-verifications, carries out execution; without waiting to see merit, he grants rank and stipend. So how can the man of law-and-technique brave death to advance his persuasion, and how would the depraved minister willingly, riding his profit, withdraw himself? So the ruler is ever lower, the private gates ever more honored.

Take Yue. Rich state, strong army — yet every ruler of the central states knows Yue is no use to him. He says: it is not mine to control. Today a man may hold a state of broad land and dense people, and still, with the ruler veiled and the great ministers monopolizing power, that state is a Yue to him. To know it is unlike Yue, while failing to know one's own state has become a Yue — that is not examining the likeness. Though Yue is rich in state and strong in arms, the rulers of the central states all know it is of no benefit to themselves, saying: 'It is not something I can control.' Now one who holds a state, though his land be broad and his people many — yet if the ruler is veiled and shut off, and great ministers monopolize power, then the state is a Yue. To say one's wisdom is unlike Yue's, while failing to see one's own state is now unlike one's own — this is not examining the likeness.

When men call Qi fallen, it is not that land and cities were lost — it is that the Lü clan no longer controlled it and the Tian clan used it as their own. When men call Jin fallen, again it is not land and cities lost — it is that the Ji clan did not control it and the six ministers carved it up. Today the great ministers grip the handles and decide alone, and the ruler above does not know to take them back. That is a ruler who cannot see. To share the same disease as a dead man is to be past saving. To do the same things as a fallen state is to be past preserving. To walk today in the tracks of Qi and Jin and still want the state to rest secure — it cannot be had. What men call Qi's fall — it was not land and cities that were lost: the Lü clan did not control it, and the Tian clan used it. What is called Jin's fall — also not land and cities lost: the Ji clan did not control it, and the six ministers monopolized it. Now the great ministers grasp the handles and decide alone, while the one above does not know to gather them in — this is a ruler who is not enlightened. One with the same illness as a dead man cannot be brought to life; one who does the same things as a fallen state cannot be preserved. Now, treading the tracks of Qi and Jin yet wishing the state to be secure and to endure — it cannot be obtained.

The peril is the same at every scale. In a state of ten thousand chariots, the danger is that the great minister grows too heavy. In a state of a thousand, the danger is that those at the ruler's side grow too trusted. This is the ruler's common affliction. And the truth beneath it is colder still: minister and ruler do not share an interest — their advantage runs opposite. The ruler profits when ability is found and given office; the minister profits when the unfit are kept on and given work. The ruler profits when merit is rewarded with rank; the minister profits when the worthless grow rich and high. The ruler profits when the bold and able are used; the minister profits when the faction works for private ends. So the land is carved away while private houses swell, the ruler sinks while the great minister rises. The trouble of the ten-thousand-chariot state is that the great minister is too heavy; the trouble of the thousand-chariot state is that those at the side are too trusted — this is the ruler's common affliction. Moreover the minister has great crimes and the ruler has great failings, for the interests of minister and ruler are mutually opposed. How to show it? The ruler's profit lies in employing the able in office; the minister's profit lies in getting work though unable. The ruler's profit lies in granting rank and stipend for labor; the minister's profit lies in wealth and honor without merit. The ruler's profit lies in using heroes and the able; the minister's profit lies in cliques using private interest. Thus the state's land is shaved away while private households grow rich; the ruler above is lowered while the great minister is made heavy.

So the ruler loses his leverage and the minister gets the state; the ruler is reduced to calling himself a vassal-lord while the chief steward splits the tallies of office. This is how the minister deceives the ruler to serve himself. Of the heavy ministers of this age, those who keep their place when the ruler's position shifts are not two or three in ten. Why? Because the minister's crime is great. The man with a great crime has been deceiving his ruler; his crime warrants death. The wise man sees far and fears death — so he will not follow the man of weight. The worthy man cultivates his honesty and is ashamed to join a corrupt minister in deceiving the ruler — so he too will not follow the man of weight. Which means the followers of the man who blocks the path are either fools who do not see the danger, or filth who will not shun a crime. So the ruler loses his positional power and the minister gets the state; the ruler is changed into calling himself a sheltered vassal, while the chief minister splits the tally-tokens. This is how ministers deceive the ruler to convenience their private interest. So among the heavy ministers of the present age, those who, when the ruler changes his position, still keep firm their favor — are not two or three in ten. What is the reason? It is that the minister's crime is great. The minister with great crime: his conduct deceives the ruler, his crime deserves death. The wise man, far-sighted and fearing death, will surely not follow the man of weight. The worthy man, cultivating integrity and ashamed to join a depraved minister in deceiving his ruler, will surely not follow the man of weight. Therefore the followers of the man-who-blocks-the-road are, if not fools who do not know the danger, then certainly the filthy who do not avoid wrongdoing.

The great minister, holding these fools and filth, joins them above to deceive the ruler and below to gather loot and bleed the people — cliques banding in a ring, all speaking with one mouth, confusing the ruler, breaking the law, throwing officers and commoners into disorder, leaving the state imperiled and shrinking, the ruler worn down and disgraced. This is the great crime. The minister commits a great crime and the ruler does not stop it. This is the great failing. Let the ruler have a great failing above and the minister a great crime below, and to seek a state that does not fall — it cannot be had. The great minister, holding these foolish and filthy men, above joins with them to deceive the ruler, below joins with them to gather profit, encroach and plunder; clique and faction join in a ring, together speaking with one mouth, deluding the ruler and ruining the law, so as to throw officers and commoners into disorder, making the state imperiled and shaved-away, the ruler above wearied and disgraced. This is a great crime. The minister has a great crime and the ruler does not prohibit it — this is a great failing. To make the ruler have a great failing above and the minister a great crime below, yet seek that the state not perish — it cannot be obtained.

孤憤 The original Chinese · honored as an artifact

智術之士，必遠見而明察，不明察不能燭私；能法之士，必強毅而勁直，不勁直不能矯姦。

Opening lines, classical Chinese · The Han Feizi 韓非子