Attack by Stratagem

I In war, the best outcome is to take the enemy's whole state intact. To break it is the lesser thing. The same down the line, from regiment to company to file: take it whole, do not smash it. Sun Tzu said: In the use of arms, taking the enemy's state whole is best; breaking it comes next. A regiment whole is best, breaking it next; a company whole is best, breaking it next; a file whole is best, breaking it next.

So winning every battle you fight is not the best of all. The best of all is to break the enemy's resistance without a battle. Therefore to win a hundred battles in a hundred fights is not the best of all; to subdue the enemy's troops without fighting is the best of all.

Hence the order of war, best to worst. Attack the enemy's plans. Failing that, attack his alliances. Failing that, attack his army in the field. The worst is to attack walled cities. Thus the highest use of arms is to attack plans; next, to attack alliances; next, to attack the army; the lowest is to attack walled cities.

“To win a hundred battles out of a hundred is not the best of all. The best of all is to break the enemy without a fight.”

Storm a city only when you have no other choice. The shields and siege-towers, the engines and gear, take three months to ready; the ramps and earthworks, three months more. A commander who loses his patience and throws his men against the walls like swarming ants will lose a third of them and still not take the city. That is the disaster of the assault. Attacking cities is the method of last resort. To ready the great shields and siege-wagons, to assemble the engines and equipment, takes three months; to raise the earthen ramps takes another three. If the general cannot master his anger and sends his men swarming up like ants, he kills a third of his soldiers and the city still does not fall — this is the calamity of the assault.

So the one who is good at war breaks the enemy's troops without a battle, takes his cities without an assault, brings down his state without a long campaign. He keeps everything whole as he contends for the world. His troops are never worn out, and his gain is kept intact. This is the method of attack by stratagem. Therefore one skilled in the use of arms subdues the enemy's troops without fighting, takes his cities without assault, destroys his state without prolonged war. He must contend for all-under-heaven whole — so the troops are not blunted and the advantage is kept entire. This is the method of attacking by stratagem.

Then the rules of force. Ten to one, surround him. Five to one, attack. Two to one, split your forces and divide him. Match for match, you can give battle. Fewer, you can hold and defend. Weaker still, you can slip away. A small force that digs in stubbornly only ends up captured by the larger one. So the method of using troops: at ten to one, surround him; at five to one, attack him; at two to one, divide him. If matched, be able to fight him; if fewer, be able to defend against him; if no match for him, be able to avoid him. For a small force that holds rigid becomes the prize of a large one.

The general is the framework of the state. When that frame is sound at every joint, the state is strong. When there are gaps in it, the state is weak. Now the general is the support of the state. When the support is whole and tight, the state is sure to be strong; when the support has gaps, the state is sure to be weak.

There are three ways a ruler brings trouble on his own army. To order it forward when it cannot advance, or order it back when it cannot retreat — this is to hobble the army. To meddle in its command while ignorant of its affairs — this throws the soldiers into confusion. To direct its decisions while ignorant of where the power lies — this fills the soldiers with doubt. There are three ways a ruler can bring misfortune on his army. Not knowing that the army cannot advance, yet ordering it to advance; not knowing that it cannot retreat, yet ordering it to retreat — this is called hobbling the army. Not knowing the army's affairs, yet sharing in its governance — then the soldiers are confused. Not knowing the army's calculations of advantage, yet sharing in its command — then the soldiers doubt.

Once the army is confused and full of doubt, the trouble comes from the rival lords. This is called throwing away your own victory. When the army is confused and doubting both, the calamity of the feudal lords arrives. This is called wrecking your own army and giving the victory away.

There are five ways to know who will win. Know when to fight and when not to fight. Know how to handle both large numbers and small. Have the high and low share one purpose. Wait, prepared, for the enemy who is not. And have a general who is able and a ruler who does not rein him in. These five are the way to know victory in advance. There are five ways to know victory. He who knows when he can fight and when he cannot will win. He who knows how to use both many and few will win. He whose superiors and subordinates share one desire will win. He who waits prepared for an unprepared enemy will win. He whose general is able and whose ruler does not interfere will win. These five are the way of knowing victory.

So it is said: know the enemy and know yourself, and in a hundred battles you will never be in danger. Know yourself but not the enemy, and for every win there is a loss. Know neither the enemy nor yourself, and you will lose every battle you fight. Hence the saying: know the other and know yourself, and in a hundred battles you will not be imperiled. Not knowing the other but knowing yourself — one win, one loss. Not knowing the other and not knowing yourself — every battle is certain peril.

謀攻 The original Chinese · honored as an artifact

百戰百勝，非善之善者也；不戰而屈人之兵，善之善者也。

Opening lines, classical Chinese · The Art of War 孫子兵法